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BiosemioticsThis review article is a discussion of Stephen Cowley’s (2011) anthology entitled Distributed
Language. The review takes up some important concepts and discussions that have
acquired renewed interest within the language sciences, in and through Distributed Lan-
guage Theory. These include the claims that language is ‘distributed’, ‘non-local’ and ‘val-
ues-realising’. In particular I discuss the relation of DLT to ‘dialogical’ ideas of language and
languaging, that is, claims that human sense-making (in languaging and by other means) is
fundamentally characterised by interdependencies between different sense-makers.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction: language and languaging as distributed
This review article is based on Stephen Cowley’s (2011) Distributed Language,2 which is a collection of 10 papers dealing
with distributed cognition and language. The chapters are: S. Cowley, ‘‘Distributed language’’ (which is an overview of the the-
ory); T. Järvilehto, V.-M. Nurkkala, K. Koskela, ‘‘The role of anticipation in reading’’ (on experiments showing that readers act in
an anticipatory manner (look ahead) when reading texts aloud and that the time interval between visual ﬁxation and speech
varies with structural complexity (projectability)); A. Kravchenko, ‘‘The experiential basis of speech and writing as different cog-
nitive domains’’ (argues for the speciﬁcity of writing; writing is not a code for speech); E. Fioretou, S. Cowley, ‘‘Insightful think-
ing: cognitive dynamics and material artifacts’’ (the difﬁculty involved in assembling a complex object (a necklace) according to
prespeciﬁed rules varies with experimental conditions, more speciﬁcally, manipulating real objects vs. working with pen-and-
paper); K. Tylén, J.S. Bjørndahl, E. Weed, ‘‘Actualizing semiotic affordances in a material world’’ (experiments with subjects
assigning meanings to pictures with motivated vs. unmotivated conﬁgurations of objects); E. Tribble, ‘‘Languaging in Shake-
speare’s theatre’’ (on languaging and the absence of master texts in theatre performances in Shakespeare’s own time); B. van
Heusden, ‘‘Semiotic cognition and the logic of culture’’ (arguing for semiotic cognition as not strictly Darwinian); B. Hodges,
‘‘Ecological pragmatics: values, dialogical arrays, complexity, and caring’’ (developing a Gibsonian model of values-realising
activities, including languaging) J. Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, ‘‘Symbols as constraints: the structuring of dynamics and self-organiza-
tion in natural language’’ (on different kinds of symbols, and the emergence of language from languaging at different timed to say.
grateful
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the papers have previously been published in Pragmatics and Cognition, vol. 17 (2009).
The members of the Distributed Language Group (DLG) and the contributors to Distributed Language claim that language
is distributed: ‘‘Far from being reducible to a system ‘in the brain’, language must be viewed as radically heterogeneous and
as spread across space, time and bodies’’ (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 178).3 Furthermore, as some authors put it, if language is dis-
tributed, it is non-local; it cannot be located to any single place, such as the speaker’s brain, or on any single time-scale (Stef-
fensen and Cowley, 2010). ‘Distributed Language Theory’ (henceforth DLT) also states that, in addition to being distributed,
language is embodied (not merely abstractly procedural), embedded (not merely representational, but shaping and shaped
by social systems in a cultural world), enacted (‘‘living in or realised in and through action’’, rather than being mainly a resource
for static representations), extended, situated (Steffensen, 187), multi-scalar (existing on different time-scales), ecological (Cow-
ley, 4), and dialogical (Cowley, 5) (linked to other-orientation, although this feature has been masked by the written language
bias in linguistics). Yet, not all contributors agree on all points (cf. below), and Steffensen (187) in fact applauds a ‘‘discussion of
the differences’’.
Language originates in ‘‘how living bodies co-ordinate with the world’’ (Cowley, 2), i.e. in what the authors (after Matur-
ana and others) call languaging, i.e. linguistic practices in real-life cognitive and communicative (inter)activities. Only sec-
ondarily, humans develop language systems as abstractions from languaging; they then acquire beliefs about how language
is structured (a ‘‘language stance’’; Cowley, 2011), and can use these structured symbols as constraints on further languaging
(Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi). Hence, Cowley (11) formulates his slogan ‘‘Dynamics ﬁrst and symbols afterwards’’.
Yet, this book is not only about distributed language, but just as much about distributed cognition, perception and action.
Many articles argue that perception, thinking, action and the anticipation of action effects are empirically and conceptually
intertwined. To take a traditional example, visual perception is not primarily about the reception of incoming signals, but
about active bodily actions (moving head and eyes) and object manipulation, to explore the environment and expose oneself
to its affordances (e.g. Noë, 2004). A central concept is anticipatory dynamics in speaking, listening, cognition and reading
(Järvilehto et al., Fioretou and Cowley, 75).
DLT has a rather close relation to biosemiotics, although this is more pronounced in Cowley et al. (2010): Signifying Bodies,
less so in Distributed Language. (My review will contain some references to Signifying Bodies as well.) In addition to the kin-
ship with distributed cognition and biosemiotics, DLG shares assumptions with relational and dialogical theories of human
sense-making. Alfredo Dinis (2010: 82), in Cowley et al. (2010), cites ‘‘three theses on mind and cognition’’ formulated by the
Canadian philosopher Evan Thompson:
1. ‘‘Embodiment. The mind is not located in the head, but is embodied in the whole organism embedded in its
environment’’.
2. ‘‘Emergence. Embodied cognition is constituted by emergent and self-organized processes that span and interconnect the
brain, the body and the environment’’.
3. ‘‘Self-Other co-determination. In social creatures, embodied cognition emerges from the dynamic co-determination of self
and other’’ (Thompson, 2001: 2).
Despite formulations such as (3) above, it is debatable if DLT and biosemiotics are sufﬁciently dialogical. I shall return to
this point in the discussion.
Some papers in the volume are more theoretical in orientation, especially Cowley, Steffensen, Hodges, Ra˛czaszek-Leonar-
di and to some extent Kravchenko and van Heusden. Others are also based on particular empirical studies, especially Järvi-
lehto et al., Fioretou and Cowley, Tylén et al. and Tribble. Although the volume is quite coherent, the papers exhibit
considerable variation with regard to topical domains and methods. This is deﬁnitely a great asset. Rather than discussing
details of each paper, I shall here discuss some of the ideas that emerged from reading the volume as a whole.2. Distribution in languaging (cognition) or language?
The term ‘distributed language’ goes back to Hutchins’s (1995) notion of ‘distributed cognition’: ‘‘The individual human
mind is not conﬁned within the head, but extends throughout the living body and includes the world beyond the biological
membrane of the organism, especially the interpersonal, social world of self and other’’ (Thompson, 2001: 2; quoted by dif-
ferent contributors to Cowley et al., 2010: 82, 112). ‘‘Such a distributed cognitive system has cognitive properties that cannot
be inferred from the components alone, no matter how much we know about the details of the components’ properties.’’
(Steffensen et al., 2010: 213).
Note that these quotes are about situated, cognitive or communicative projects/activities (languaging); Hutchins, for
example, talked about the activities in the cockpit of an aircraft. However, talk about ‘‘distributed language’’ runs the risk
of being associated with distribution of abstract linguistic resources across distant spaces and varying time-scales: language
is seen as spread across media (speech, writing, electronic media), genres (from swearing to mathematics), activities and
functions, heterogeneous linguistic forms and lects, i.e. the opposite of the unitary (national) language systems often3 References below to authors and page references are to the book under review, unless speciﬁcally stated.
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thing (‘‘language’’) being the sum of pieces, a ‘‘meshwork’’ rather than a uniﬁed system. This is rather different from the dis-
tributed activity as an integrated whole, components functioning together (Hutchins). ‘‘A distributed perspective necessarily
concerns interaction in its wholeness’’ (Pedersen, 2010: 255, with reference to Steffensen et al. in the same volume, i.e., Cow-
ley et al., 2010); a team as a collective can solve problems that individuals cannot solve on their own (Pedersen, 2010: 262).
DL theorists may therefore do better reserve the term ‘distributed’ for languaging and interactivity, rather than for ‘the sec-
ond-order language’.
But the problem does not end here. Emergent integrity is essential for understanding something (putting hitherto sepa-
rate pieces of information or knowledge together), but fragmentation is still a salient feature of the social world. And it is not
only large sociocultural representations that are characterised by partial integration, fragmentation and tensions (Marková,
2003). Heterogeneities in sociocultures can also be realised in situ (in a focus group, for example). A conversation, regarded
as a distributed system, is of course partly integrated as ‘‘interactivity’’, but parties can still talk past each other (e.g. Peder-
sen’s, 2010, own example of a simulated emergency care situation with a doctor and a nurse not always synchronised but
rather sometimes working with parallel projects). While sense-making implies some integration, sufﬁcient (as opposed to
complete) understanding for current purposes is realised on the basis of partial holism and partial integration.
3. Non-local or non-localisable?
‘‘Human cognition is non-local (Steffensen and Cowley, 2010), i.e. it draws on brains, bodies and surroundings, including
other cognizers, artefacts, social relations and environmental structures’’ (Steffensen, 186). Although we are accustomed to
thinking of the world in terms of ‘‘things’’ located in space and time, it would be misguided to assign meanings (in langu-
aging or language) to ‘‘simple locations’’ (Cowley, 6; Steffensen and Cowley, 2010: 346). This would amount to a ‘‘fallacy
of misplaced concreteness’’ (Whitehead’s, 1926, expression cited in Steffensen and Cowley, 2010: 341). Instead, one should
invoke a ‘‘ﬁeld theory’’ (Steffensen and Cowley, 2010: 346). It is part of the ‘‘relational turn’’ in cognitive sciences (Cowley
et al., 2010: 101).
Accordingly, what DLT means by ‘non-local’ seems to be that it is meaningless to try to determine where meanings are in
relation to sense-makers and their environments; it would be especially nonsensical with regard to the conventional dichot-
omy ‘‘inside the brain (or the organism)’’ vs. ‘‘out there in the environment’’. Meanings are relational phenomena which can-
not be localised exactly: they belong to an ‘‘inter-world’’ (Linell, 2009: ch. 7). Similar ideas have been expressed by many, as
in this quotation:
[N]either dualism nor behaviorism really permit us to talk as we do in life. A conversation does not take place inside each
other’s heads alternately, nor at the surface of our bodies in their overt behavior; it is really in the region between the
speakers that the conversation takes place (Barrett, 1979: 184, quoted by McCloskey, 1994: 347/italics added/PL).
However, this kind of formulation may suggest that, after all, a conversation and its effects are local phenomena. And it is
true that participants to interactivities are actually tied to local situations. Conversation Analysis and ethnomethodological
studies of interaction have shown that situated meanings are ‘‘locally produced’’ on (in principle) a turn-to-turn basis; in
conversation, we are engaged in understanding and responding to (more or less immediately) prior contributions. However,
‘local’ (or ‘non-local’) in this sense is not the interpretation we are after, when we argue that it is meaningless to determine a
localisation exactly, as we argued above. My own preference would therefore be to talk about what DLT is after as ‘non-
localisability’.
Yet, apart from this, the association of the notion of non-localisability in DLT theorising to Hutchins’s (1995) ‘distributed
cognition’ is dubious, since it is hardly clear that Hutchins himself makes the assumption of non-localisability. Rather,
Hutchins is simply concerned with the fact that sense-makers often make use of external artefacts and other environmental
factors in situated cognition; cognition would still take place in information-processing systems, primarily in the brains of
team members, but presumably also in computers and instruments. Accordingly, Hutchins seems to stick to the inner/outer
dichotomy, which is exactly what is partially relativised with the idea of non-localisability (Button, 2008). It is misleading to
think of meanings, ideas and thoughts as being inside the head or brain, let alone in the computer. Rather, sense-makers use
their processing embodied brains in making sense of the world. Instead of saying that meanings are in the head (locative
case), we could perhaps say that meanings are made with the head (instrumental case), in the presence or absence of exter-
nal aids (the latter case being true of solo thinking without any (non-trivial) use of any physical environment).
4. Living organisms and sense-making
DLT is closely related to biosemiotics and organism–environment theories. This transpires from several chapters in Dis-
tributed Language, although it is more evident in Signifying Bodies. Although it has become increasingly clear in many sub-
disciplines dealing with human communication, including ethnomethodology, applied Conversation Analysis and gesture
studies (Mondada, 2009), that languaging too must be seen as intercorporeal, this general ‘‘embodiment turn’’ invites an
interpretation of a person’s body/organism as an important localisation. At the same time, some DLT proponents of organ-
ism–environment theory (Steffensen, 2011) accuse Clark (1997, 2008) of being too organism-centred. I would be inclined to
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there seems to be a contradiction in DLT in, on the one hand, stressing the importance of the body and a system with an
organism and its environment, and on the other hand, promoting a radical abolition of the inner–outer distinction (cf. the
non-localisability thesis). Indeed, Steffensen (2013) himself points to the ‘‘interactional asymmetry’’ between organism
and environment; ‘‘‘agents have goals or norms according to which they are acting’ (Barandian et al., 2009: 5, which envi-
ronments do not’’ (Steffensen, 2013). In this context, it will be important to distinguish between where processing takes
place (largely in brains, but also in some artefacts, like computers) and where meanings, language etc. are (for which the
attempts at localisation are meaningless in a crucial sense, see above).
However, the individual organism is not the only sense-maker in many organism–environment systems. The ecosocial
environment includes other sense-making persons. This is the basic dialogical point, the importance of which biosemiotics
tends to underestimate. The role of others is only incidentally taken up in the papers of the volume under review. However,
one reason for this might be that several of the empirical papers (Järvilehto et al., Fioretou and Cowley, Tylén et al.) do not
deal people working in teams. Rather, they are concerned with single problem-solvers in experimental situations in which
they explore environments including artefacts (text, pictures, actual objects).
Biosemiotics forces us to ponder the question of what the difference is between a theory of living organisms (or systems)
(biosemiotics; after Maturana, etc.) and a theory of (dialogical) sense-making. Biosemiotics deals with, among other things,
signal transduction between cells; for example, when a primary molecular signal reaches a cell boundary, a receptor re-
sponds by changing its conformation, and activates a mediator protein, which in turn activates secondary signals inside
of the membrane, which give rise to a cascade of intracellular processes (Hoffmeyer, 2010: 29). Is this similar to the
sense-making practices of human agents, or their way-ﬁnding in the world?
In my view it is important to distinguish between cognitive processes and their content, between signal transduction and
humanmeaning-making. (This is not to say that there are any absolutely sharp boundaries.) Within biosemiotics, there seem
to be few penetrating discussions of differences between intra/intercellular processes or organisms’ reactions to environ-
mental properties, and language and sense-making through languaging, or information vs. knowledge, different kinds of
‘‘codes’’ (Linell, submitted for publication), etc. There is not much awareness of the role of metaphors; e.g., when re-enco-
dings across a series of signal transductions are seen as analogous to human linguistic communication. However, Ra˛czas-
zek-Leonardi (163ff.), who deals with symbolic modes in living systems (building on H. Pattee), opens up for the
assumption that language really makes a difference.
Semiosis distinguishes life from non-life (Hoffmeyer, 2010: 27). But many biosemioticians’ ‘‘living systems theory’’
(organism–environment systems) seems to have no (speciﬁc) place for other persons in the environment: other sense-mak-
ers with their minded bodies, or embodied minds, are simply immersed in ecosocial environments.
In biosemiotics there is often an insufﬁcient attention to dialogue and the role of other sense-makers ‘‘out there’’. And yet,
dialogue is demonstrably crucial for human sense-making from the very start of individual life. We could just recall some
facts about early infant development (e.g. Trevarthen, Bråten, Fogel, as quoted in Linell, 2009), in particular, the immediacy
of the other in infant-carer (or deaf–blind child-carer) communication. Later we witness the role of others as guides to the
outside world beyond reach (especially in the case of the congenitally deaf–blind), and much later the role of the generalised
other (community) and several such others (thirds; different individuals, groups and communities holding different opinions
on important matters; others to which self attributes sense-making abilities).5. ‘‘Values-realising communication’’?
One of Bert Hodges’s favourite concepts (in the volume under review, and elsewhere) is ‘‘ecological, values-realizing
dynamics’’ (135). The term ‘‘value’’ may have varied meanings, and Hodges’s paper does not do enough to clear the ground.
However, one can turn to Hodges and Baron (1992) for an illuminating discussion.
Hodges and Baron build upon Gibson’s (1979) theories of perception and action. Values are, for them, embedded in
the environmental arrays and activities of perception (Hodges and Baron, op.cit.: 269) and action directed to affor-
dances of objects in the world. They are higher-order constraints on perception-action cycles, and as such different
from (natural) laws, conventional rules and situated (individual or shared) goals; rather, values are ’’properties that
underwrite (have priority over) goals and rules’’ (Hodges, 142). Values seem to be related to (what others may call)
apperceived meanings and overall purposes, often remaining largely implicit in interaction, in selecting what is ‘‘efﬁ-
cient’’, ‘‘appropriate’’ or ‘‘working’’ in the world, although Hodges often prefers to talk about what is morally ‘‘good’’.
Hodges and Baron (op.cit.) give concrete examples from the upbringing of infants, more speciﬁcally their learning of
table manners.
Values in actions and affordances of objects can be very different, arranged in and changing with situations, dynamically
negotiated ‘‘heterarchically’’ (Hodges and Baron, 281). They are, according to a quote from Turvey (1990), ‘‘deﬁned over mul-
tiple scales of space and time’’ (Hodges and Baron, 1992: 269) and ‘‘self-organizing’’ (270) within cultures. Although one may
perhaps sometimes substitute ‘‘meanings’’ and ‘‘purposes’’ for Hodges’s ‘‘values’’, his own terminological or conceptual
choice suggests that he is basically interested in human interaction and dialogue as a moral undertaking (‘‘enact and embody
the good’’; Hodges, 151); there are references to Bakhtin’s notion of answerability (one might also have mentioned ethno-
methodology’s accountability), and to G.H. Mead and Charles Taylor (152).
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and this is a better idea than two (other) more ‘‘limited models for understanding language’’, namely, representation and tool
use (150). Caring is a primary function of conversing (149); orienting, integrating, way-ﬁnding (149), helping humans to rec-
ognise and realise existing (and each others’) affordances. In Cowley et al. (2010), several authors connect distributed cog-
nition theory to care, health, well-being, even happiness and love.
Conversing is ‘‘a pragmatic activity that is concerned to realize appropriateness (i.e., values) from beginning to end. Such
pragmatic activity is not caused, but jointly-enacted within the integrity of the ecosystem as a whole’’ (151). Pedersen (2010)
regards dialogue (projects in interaction) as co-action, based on sharing and caring. Here ‘‘sharing’’ would seem to be trying
to share one’s insights and feelings with the other, and ‘‘caring’’ is acting with respect for the other (Pedersen, 264).
However, doing good is not automatic or inevitable. It requires work (Hodges, 151). Communication and languaging are
not always about striving for consensus and intersubjectivity. Starting from this insight, Hodges goes into an interesting dis-
cussion of alterity, the fact that different parties to communication have different background knowledge and different inter-
ests, and often different (and not always good) intentions. Indeed, I think that dialogical theories strive to explain any kind of
human sense-making and social organisation, whether monologising or dialogising (e.g. Linell, 2009). At the same time, we
may derive an applied ethics (such as the ‘Golden Rule’) from dialogical ideas, following, among many others, Buber, Bakhtin,
Lévinas and Hodges.
To summarise, Hodges comes out as a dialogist. Thus, he quotes Thibault (2004: 2) on p. 151: ‘‘the principle of the other –
the nonself . . . is an affordance – perhaps the most fundamental of all – of the ecosocial semiotic environment. . . This obser-
vation suggests that the ontological basis of our bio-social being is the principle of alterity.’’
6. Some other real or potential differences of opinion
DLT is not one homogeneous theory. As we have seen, terms like ‘‘distributed’’, ‘‘values’’, ‘‘non-local’’, ‘‘ecological’’, and
others are far from unambiguous. The following are some other points where contributors seem to hold divergent or disput-
able opinions (I leave these for discussion elsewhere):
 There must be a language system (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 178), vs. language is not a system (Steffensen, 185).
 Direct interaction and reading a book are radically different (Kravchenko, 38) vs. similar processes (Järvilehto, 28).
 How much signiﬁcance should be attributed to the ‘‘language stance’’ (Cowley, 2011) and its effects? A language is a sec-
ond-order construct (Love, 2004; Steffensen, 192): it provides stabilised patterns of languaging in social context (Steffen-
sen, 194), but also (sometimes false) beliefs about them (cf. Linell, 2012).
 What are the implications of talk about ‘‘the feeling of thinking’’ (Cowley, 5)? That ‘‘thinking’’ is ‘‘just’’ a sensation, of no
particular importance?
 What is the point of seeing language as ‘‘irreducibly bound up with metabolic activity’’ (Steffensen, 185)
7. Conclusions
DLT challenges the assumption that verbal language is unique. It is a sound scientiﬁc strategy to try to ‘‘derive language
from non-language’’ (Lindblom et al., 1984: 187). The idea of a distributed language assumes that language interacts with
other phenomena (perception, action, brain, body, environments, artefacts, different media, etc.) and it is therefore improb-
able that it constitutes a totally separated and very special system. Tylén et al. raise more speciﬁc arguments against lan-
guage modules; brain centres (such as Broca’s) traditionally assumed to be specialised on language deal with other
semiotic phenomena too, and conﬁgurations of everyday objects are treated differently depending on whether they are com-
municative or non-communicative.
Biosemiotics includes both intracellular and intercellular signalling processes and human languaging; language serves as
a metaphor for intra/intercellular processes (although even Hoffmeyer, 2010, admits that language does make a difference).
Biosemiotics tends to be vague about the speciﬁcity of language (as opposed to life in general), as well as about the difference
between information and meaning (Barbieri, 2010). Yet, language is largely conventional, dependent on other sense-makers,
while cellular signalling involves causal, biochemical processes (Linell, 2012, submitted for publication). Biosemiotics and
organism–environment theories therefore provide more of an explanation of the interaction between living organisms
and their environments, more than for human sense-making in its ecosocial environment involving other human sense-
makers.
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